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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
 
EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge. 
 
 Harold S. Alston appeals the denial by the district 
court of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  He argues that 
his present incarceration by the state of Delaware is illegal 
because his conviction was bottomed on self-incriminating 
statements taken in violation of his constitutional rights.  More 
specifically, Alston claims that he was interrogated by the 
authorities in violation of his right to counsel as established 
by the Sixth Amendment and by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966).  He also claims that his waiver of his Miranda right to 
counsel was coerced.  We find that the Sixth Amendment violation 
was harmless error, that petitioner's invocation of his Miranda 
right to counsel was anticipatory since it was made outside of 
the context of custodial interrogation, and was thus ineffective, 
and that his waiver was not coerced.  We will therefore affirm. 
 
  
 I. 
  
 In the summer of 1985, police officers were 
investigating a number of robberies that had taken place in and 
around Wilmington, Delaware.  At the scene of the robbery of 
Allen Medkeff and Michelle Sands (the "Medkeff-Sands robberies"), 
police recovered a fingerprint from an item touched by the 
robber.  Acting upon information provided by a confidential 
informant linking petitioner Harold S. Alston to the Medkeff-
Sands robberies, the police compared the recovered fingerprint to 
Alston's known prints, and established that the prints matched.  
A warrant for Alston's arrest issued, charging him with first 
degree robbery and second degree conspiracy, and he was arrested 
in North Carolina on August 19th.  Waiving extradition, he was 
brought to Delaware on August 23rd, and was interrogated that 
same day by Delaware State Police.  The police gave Alston his 
Miranda warnings, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 
444-45.  He waived his Miranda rights and the police proceeded to 
question him about the robberies, including the Medkeff-Sands 
robberies.  Though at first denying any involvement, Alston 
eventually admitted to a number of robberies after the police 
reminded him of the fingerprint that they had recovered at the 
scene.  In light of the offer by the police interrogators that 
they would recommend to the prosecutor that Alston be charged 
with only one count of robbery if he cooperated, Alston admitted 
to participating in the Medkeff-Sands robberies, as well as six 
other robberies committed during the summer of 1985.  Alston was 
taken before a Justice of the Peace on the robbery and conspiracy 
  
charges and was committed to Gander Hill prison for pretrial 
detention. 
 Three days later, on August 26, 1985, Alston was 
interviewed by a person from the Public Defender's office, who 
Alston assumed was an attorney.1  See App. at 227.  During the 
course of the interview, Alston signed a form letter, addressed 
to the warden of the Gander Hill facility: 
 Dear Sir: 
 
  I am presently a detainee in this institution and 
I will not speak to any police officer, law enforcement 
officers, their agents, or representatives from the 
Department of Justice, of any jurisdiction, without a 
Public Defender being present at such a meeting. 
 
  I further do not wish to be removed from my [cell] 
and brought to a meeting with the above-mentioned 
officers for the purpose of discussing a waiver of my 
constitutional rights in this regard. 
 
     Signed   /s/Harold S. Alston 
     Date     8-26-85 
App. at 4.  The letter was never actually delivered to Gander 
Hill's warden, since the established practice at Gander Hill was 
that someone from the warden's office would call the Public 
Defender's office when officers sought to question a prisoner, 
and inquire whether such a form letter had been executed.  If a 
prisoner wished to speak to the authorities notwithstanding his 
prior execution of the invocation of counsel form letter, he 
                     
1
.  The testimony by an investigator from the Public Defender's 
office at the suppression hearing held in the state trial court 
suggested that the individual who met with Alston was an 
investigator, and not an attorney.  See App. at 71-72.  The 
outcome of this appeal, however, does not turn on the identity or 
the status of the individual with whom Alston spoke. 
  
would be asked to sign a form waiving his previous request to 
have counsel present during an interrogation.  Alston never 
signed this second form. 
 On August 28th, Alston was indicted for the Medkeff-
Sands robberies.  On August 29th, he was taken from Gander Hill 
to the Wilmington police department for processing on the new 
charges stemming from the six other robberies to which he had 
confessed on the 23rd and for further questioning.  The warden's 
office made no inquiry of the Public Defender's office regarding 
whether Alston had signed the invocation of counsel form.  At the 
police station, after the police read Alston his Miranda rights 
and he waived them, Alston was questioned for a second time, six 
days after his first interrogation on August 23rd.  During this 
second interrogation, Alston confirmed his prior confessions, 
and, after prompting by one interrogator, confessed to another 
robbery that he had not mentioned before.  It is the legality of 
the use of this second confession at his trial that forms the 
core of petitioner's appeal. 
 Due to Alston's perceived lack of candor, the police 
informed the prosecutor of the promise made, but declined to 
recommend that Alston be charged with one count of robbery.  The 
grand jury subsequently delivered a superseding indictment 
against Alston and a number of other defendants, indicting Alston 
on nine counts of first degree robbery and nine counts of second 
degree conspiracy. 
 Before trial, Alston sought to suppress the statements 
he gave to the police on the 23rd and the 29th, claiming that 
  
both of his statements were involuntary and, further, that his 
second statement was taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  The trial court denied the suppression motion.  
See App. at 117-21.  Alston proceeded to trial, where the state 
introduced, inter alia, the fingerprint evidence, the 
confessions, and the testimony of Medkeff and Sands, both of whom 
identified Alston.  Alston was found guilty on seven of the nine 
robbery counts and on all of the conspiracy counts, including the 
Medkeff-Sands robberies. 
 On direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed 
with Alston that the statement made during the August 29th 
interrogation concerning the Medkeff-Sands robberies was taken in 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but ruled that 
the error was harmless, since there was substantial evidence 
supporting the conviction.  See Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 
308-09 (Del.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989).  The Court 
also found that the statements were made voluntarily, that 
Alston's waivers of his Miranda rights were proper, and that 
Alston's execution of the form provided to him by the Public 
Defender's office and never transmitted to the warden did not 
serve to invoke his Miranda right to counsel.  See id. at 307-08, 
310-11.  Finally, the Court reversed one of the conspiracy 
convictions relating to the Medkeff-Sands robberies, since the 
evidence showed only one agreement.  See id. at 312.  Alston's 
petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States 
Supreme Court, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989), as was his application for 
  
state post-conviction relief, Alston v. State, 590 A.2d 502 (Del. 
1991) (unpublished disposition). 
 Alston petitioned the district court for a writ of 
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming, inter alia, 
that his execution of the invocation of counsel form letter was 
sufficient to trigger his Miranda right to counsel, thus 
rendering inadmissible at trial any statements made during the 
August 29th interrogation.  The petition was referred to a 
magistrate judge, who recommended that the petition be denied.  
The district court, after a de novo review of the record, adopted 
the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation and denied the 
petition for habeas relief.  A motions panel of this Court issued 
a certificate of probable cause.  See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). 
 
  
 II. 
 The matter was properly before the district court, and 
this Court has jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal.  See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253.  The claims raised in the petition were 
properly exhausted, having been fairly presented to the Delaware 
Supreme Court.  See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 
(1989); Wise v. Fulcomer, 958 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1992).  In 
deciding this appeal, the Court exercises a mixed standard of 
review.  The district court's legal conclusions are subject to 
plenary review, but factual conclusions are reviewed for clear 
error.  See Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2283 (1992).  There is a 
presumption that historical fact-finding by a state court, 
whether trial or appellate, is correct.2  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117 (1985); Sumner v. 
Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981). 
 
                     
2
.  As this Court stated recently, there are "four prerequisites 
for giving deference to state court findings:  1) a hearing on 
the merits of a factual issue, 2) made by a state court of 
competent jurisdiction, 3) in a proceeding to which the 
petitioner and the state were parties, 4) evidenced by a written 
finding, opinion or other reliable and adequate written indicia."  
Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 254 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1679 
(1992).  There is no indication in the briefs or the record that 
the review by the Delaware Superior Court and Supreme Court did 
not satisfy the Reese requirements, and petitioner has not 
questioned on appeal the correctness of the state courts' 
findings of fact. 
  
 III. 
 Petitioner argues that his execution of the form 
provided to him by the Public Defender's office was sufficient to 
invoke his right to counsel and to thwart any further police-
initiated questioning, thereby rendering inadmissible the 
statements he gave at the August 29th interrogation.  Our 
analysis of this claim must begin with a review of Miranda and 
its progeny. 
 
 A. 
 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme 
Court examined an individual's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination in the context 
of custodial interrogation, and concluded that certain procedural 
safeguards were necessary to "dissipate the compulsion inherent 
in custodial interrogation and, in so doing, guard against 
abridgement of [a] suspect's Fifth Amendment rights."  Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468; 
see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
into the Fourteenth Amendment).  These safeguards include certain 
rights that an accused must be informed of, and must waive, 
before interrogation can commence: 
 He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has 
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can 
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the 
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him 
prior to any questioning if he so desires.  Opportunity 
  
to exercise these rights must be afforded to him 
throughout the interrogation. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.  Only if there is a voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent waiver of the rights expressed in the warnings 
can police question a suspect without counsel being present and 
introduce at trial any statements made during the interrogation.  
See id.; Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
 In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme 
Court added a second layer of prophylaxis to the protections 
dictated by Miranda.  In Edwards, the defendant stated during the 
course of interrogation that he wanted to negotiate a "deal," and 
was provided with a phone and the number of the county attorney.  
After calling the county attorney, defendant stated that he 
wanted a lawyer before making any deal.  See id. at 479.  All 
interrogation ceased and he was taken back to his cell.  The 
following day, interrogation was resumed without an attorney 
being present and notwithstanding the defendant's assertion that 
he did not wish to speak.  During this second interrogation, the 
defendant made incriminating statements, which were eventually 
used against him and contributed to his conviction.  See id. at 
480.  In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that 
once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, "a valid waiver of 
that right cannot be established by showing only that he 
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation 
even if he has been advised of his rights."  Id. at 484.  The 
Court further held that once a suspect invokes the right, there 
  
can be no further police-initiated interrogation "until counsel 
has been made available to him, unless the [suspect] himself 
initiates further communication."  Id. at 484-85; see also 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (holding that 
after counsel is requested, there can be no further police-
initiated interrogation without counsel being present).  Thus, 
once a suspect has asked for the assistance of counsel, "it is 
presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the 
authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is 
itself the product of the 'inherently compelling pressures' [of 
custodial interrogation] and not the purely voluntary choice of 
the suspect."  Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988); cf. 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-06 (1975) (finding no 
Miranda violation when the police resumed questioning after the 
suspect's invocation of his right to cut off questioning was 
"scrupulously honored").  The Edwards protection is not offense-
specific.  Rather, a suspect who has requested the presence of 
counsel cannot be questioned concerning any crime, not just the 
one that put him in custody.  See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683-84.  
Further, the Edwards presumption focuses on the suspect's state 
of mind, not the police's.  "[C]ustodial interrogation must be 
conducted pursuant to established procedures, and those 
procedures in turn must enable an officer who proposes to 
initiate an interrogation to determine whether the suspect has 
previously requested counsel."  Id. at 687.  Thus, officers who 
interrogate a suspect after the suspect has invoked his right to 
counsel are charged with the knowledge of the prior invocation.  
  
See, e.g., United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 
1983) (holding that knowledge of request for counsel "is imputed 
to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the 
suspect"). 
 The remedy for a violation of Miranda or Edwards is 
straightforward--any statement given in violation of the rules 
established in these cases cannot be introduced into evidence in 
the state's case-in-chief.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; cf. New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (recognizing a 
"public safety" exception to Miranda); Harris v. New York, 401 
U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (allowing the use of statements taken in 
violation of Miranda for purposes of impeachment). 
 The notion that custodial interrogations, in and of 
themselves, have an inherent coercive effect on an accused is the 
essential predicate to the prescription contained in the Miranda-
Edwards line of cases, that counsel be present, if one is 
requested, when an interrogation occurs in a custodial setting.  
"In essence, Miranda counsel is a buffer against the power of a 
state tempted to force incriminating statements from an unwilling 
suspect."  James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and 
Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 975, 
989 (1986); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (recognizing that 
"the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against 
compelled self-incrimination] is the respect a government--state 
or federal--must accord to the dignity and integrity of its 
citizens").  As one commentator has noted, "[t]he [Supreme] Court 
presumes that the confluence of interrogation and custody 
  
generate an intolerable degree of pressure upon a criminal 
suspect.  Thus, the combined impact of interrogation and custody 
make[s] counsel's compulsion-dispelling presence--or, at least, 
the opportunity to claim that presence--essential."  Tomkovicz, 
supra, at 991 (footnotes omitted).  Providing an accused the 
option of having a lawyer present during a custodial 
interrogation was the Miranda Court's practical accommodation of 
the need to shelter an accused's constitutional right to be free 
from compelled self-incrimination, with the public's legitimate 
interest in the interrogation of suspected criminals.3  See 
Moran, 475 U.S. at 426 ("Admissions of guilt are more than merely 
'desirable'; they are essential to society's compelling interest 
in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the 
law.") (citation omitted); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-81.  It is 
Miranda's role in protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege in the 
singular context of custodial interrogation that is its "only 
                     
3
.  In contrast, the Miranda Court could have completely 
forbidden custodial interrogation, or could have required that 
all such interrogation be conducted with a judge present.  Cf. 
Davis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2358 
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 
abrogates the Miranda safeguards in federal criminal prosecutions 
and requires only a determination of voluntariness); State v. 
Scales, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 1994 WL 315702, at *5 (Minn. June 
30, 1994) (requiring that "all custodial interrogation . . . 
shall be electronically recorded where feasible" and holding that 
statements taken in violation of the requirement shall be 
suppressed if the violation is "substantial").  A complete 
prohibition, however, might have cut too broadly, since it is 
only compelled self-incrimination, not self-incrimination per se, 
that is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 478; Tomkovicz, supra, at 989 n.55. 
  
source of legitimacy."  Moran, 475 U.S. at 425.4  Because the 
presence of both a custodial setting and official interrogation 
is required to trigger the Miranda right-to-counsel prophylactic, 
absent one or the other, Miranda is not implicated.5  See 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78; United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 
584-85 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 
292, 297 (1990) ("It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of 
coercion results from the interaction of custody and official 
interrogation."). 
 
                     
4
.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, the Miranda 
safeguards are not constitutionally mandated and serve only to 
protect the privilege against compelled self-incrimination in the 
context of custodial interrogation.  See, e.g., Connecticut v. 
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); Moran, 475 U.S. at 424-25; New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974); see also Giuffre v. Bissell, No. 93-
5541, slip op. at 26 (3d Cir. August 4, 1994) (recognizing that 
the Miranda right to counsel is "a procedural safeguard, and not 
a substantive right"). 
5
.  Hence, the focus in much of the Court's Miranda jurisprudence 
on the legal contours of "custody," see, e.g., Stansbury v. 
California, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1528-29 (1994) 
(per curiam); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984); 
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325-26 (1969), and 
"interrogation," see, e.g., Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526 
(1987); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468-69 (1981); Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980), and the requirement 
that both be present for the Miranda protections to attach. 
  
 B. 
 In the instant case, the magistrate judge found, and 
the district court agreed, that petitioner's execution of the 
invocation form was insufficient to trigger his Miranda right to 
counsel.  The magistrate found that the attempt to invoke the 
right to counsel was made outside of the context of custodial 
interrogation, and was thus ineffective.  Petitioner argues that 
this case satisfies both prongs of Miranda, pointing out that he 
was already in custody, he was a suspect in a number of 
robberies, and he had already been interrogated at the time that 
he made his request for counsel.  All of these circumstances 
taken together, concludes petitioner, created the "atmosphere of 
coercion," Br. at 18, that Miranda and progeny seek to protect 
against, and mandates a finding that his invocation of his right 
to counsel was proper.  We disagree. 
 As evidenced by the Supreme Court's repeated rehearsal 
of the issue, the term "custodial interrogation" defies easy 
definition.  We have recognized that such a determination 
requires individualized analysis on a case-by-case basis.  See 
United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 584 (3d Cir. 1980).  
Assuming, arguendo, that petitioner was in custody for purposes 
of Miranda analysis,6 we disagree that at the time petitioner 
                     
6
.  When he signed the request for counsel form on August 26th, 
Alston was obviously in custody in the physical sense, given that 
he was being held in a prison.  However, "[w]hile Miranda may 
apply to one who is in custody for an offense unrelated to the 
interrogation, incarceration does not ipso facto render an 
interrogation custodial."  Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 
(8th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 865 
(1988); see, e.g., Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428-29 (9th 
  
requested counsel he was being interrogated, or that 
interrogation was imminent.  Petitioner was questioned on August 
23rd and again on August 29th.  There is no evidence in the 
record to suggest that he had been questioned on the 26th, the 
date on which he made his request for counsel, or that there was 
a continuous interrogation during the period from August 23rd to 
August 29th.  His putative invocation of his right to counsel on 
August 26th was made while he was sitting in his jail cell 
speaking with a representative of the Public Defender's office, 
far removed from the strictures of custodial interrogation feared 
by the Miranda Court.  See id. at 590 n.1 (Adams, J., concurring) 
("In Innis the Court indicated that "interrogation," as 
conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of 
compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.").  
Absent the "interaction of custody and official interrogation," 
Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297, the petitioner's Miranda right to 
counsel had simply not attached when petitioner signed the 
invocation form in his cell. 
 
(..continued) 
Cir. 1978) (finding that inmate questioned during a search of his 
cell was not in custody because there was no greater restraint on 
his freedom than usual).  Though Alston was in custody as a 
suspect in the Medkeff-Sands robberies, he was not necessarily 
"in custody" for Miranda purposes as to interrogation on the 
other robberies.  Since we decide Alston's appeal on other 
grounds, we need not reach the issue of whether he was in custody 
for Miranda purposes when he requested counsel. 
  
 C. 
  
 In essence, Alston asks this Court to adopt, as an 
extension of the reach of Miranda, a rule allowing a suspect to 
invoke the right to counsel in cases where the suspect is in 
custody, has already been interrogated, and may be reinterrogated 
at some point in the future.  We decline the invitation.  As did 
the district judge, we find the Supreme Court's opinion in McNeil 
v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), to have presaged the result in 
this case.  In McNeil, the petitioner was arrested on a charge of 
armed robbery.  After a bail hearing on the armed robbery charge, 
at which he was represented by an attorney, he was repeatedly 
questioned by police officers concerning a different crime, and 
he eventually made an inculpatory statement.  See 501 U.S. at 
173-74.  After his conviction at trial, at which his statement 
was used against him, petitioner filed for a writ of habeas 
corpus, arguing that his appearance at the bail hearing, 
accompanied by an attorney, was sufficient to invoke his Miranda 
right to counsel, thus invalidating the police-initiated 
interrogation under the operation of Edwards.  See id. at 174-75.  
After carefully distinguishing the differing objectives of the 
right to counsel under Miranda and the Sixth Amendment, the Court 
rejected the argument that the assertion of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel was an explicit or implicit assertion of the 
Miranda right to counsel, holding that "[t]he rule of [Edwards] 
. . . requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably 
be construed to be expression of a desire for the assistance of 
an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the 
police."  Id. at 178.  The Court explicitly rejected the "bright-
  
line" rule proposed by McNeil--"no police-initiated questioning 
of any person in custody who has requested counsel to assist him 
in defense or interrogation"--which was similar to the one 
advocated by the instant petitioner.  See id. at 181. 
 Of particular interest to the case sub judice is the 
majority's reply to the dissent's prediction that the decision 
would be circumvented by the explicit invocation of the Miranda 
right to counsel at preliminary hearings.  See id. at 184 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  The majority noted that premature 
invocation of the Miranda right to counsel would be 
impermissible: 
 We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his 
Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 
"custodial interrogation"--which a preliminary hearing 
will not always, or even usually, involve.  If the 
Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a 
preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there is no 
logical reason why it could not be invoked by a letter 
prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to identification 
as a suspect.  Most rights must be asserted when the 
government seeks to take the action they protect 
against.  The fact that we have allowed the Miranda 
right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with 
respect to future custodial interrogation does not 
necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted 
initially outside the context of custodial 
interrogation, with similar future effect. 
Id. at 182 n.3 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Though this 
passage in McNeil is essentially dicta, being a response to a 
hypothetical posed by the dissent, we must consider it with 
deference, given the High Court's paramount position in our 
"three-tier system of federal courts," Casey v. Planned 
Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir. 1994), and its limited 
  
docket.  See Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 495 n.41 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992); accord Doughty v. 
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d 856, 861 & n.3 (1st Cir. 
1993); Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 
627 F.2d 766, 768 n.1 (7th Cir. 1980) ("A dictum in a Supreme 
Court opinion may be brushed aside by the Supreme Court as dictum 
when the exact question is later presented, but it cannot be 
treated lightly by inferior federal courts until disavowed by the 
Supreme Court.") (citing 1B Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.402, at 
112 & n.3), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 170 (1981).  The 
footnote strongly supports the proposition that, to be effective, 
a request for Miranda counsel must be made within "the context of 
custodial interrogation" and no sooner.  See United States v. 
Wright, 962 F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Barnett, 814 F. Supp. 1449, 1454 (D. Alaska 1992). 
 The antipathy expressed in McNeil towards the 
anticipatory invocation of the Miranda rights is consistent with 
Miranda's underlying principles.  The Miranda right to counsel is 
a prophylactic rule that does not operate independent from the 
danger it seeks to protect against--"the compelling atmosphere 
inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation"--and the 
effect that danger can have on a suspect's privilege to avoid 
compelled self-incrimination.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.  To 
allow an individual to interpose Miranda in a situation outside 
the custodial interrogation context would represent an 
unwarranted extension of Miranda's procedural safeguards, an 
  
extension best left to the discretion of the Supreme Court, which 
devised the Miranda safeguards in the first place and which has 
quite recently expressed disinterest in expanding them.  See, 
e.g., Davis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 
2355 (1994) (declining "to extend Edwards and require law 
enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately upon the 
making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney"); 
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 ("At least in 
part in order to preserve its clarity, we have over the years 
refused to sanction attempts to expand our Miranda holding."); 
see also Barnett, 814 F. Supp. at 1454 (assuming that footnote 3 
in McNeil "accurately predicts that the . . . Supreme Court will 
hold that an accused cannot invoke his Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel until he is taken into custody, and prior to 
interrogation, warned of those rights").  As the Supreme Court 
recognized in Innis, "[i]t is clear . . . that the special 
procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where 
a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a 
suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation."  446 U.S. at 
300.7 
                     
7
.  Petitioner points to language in Miranda itself that, read in 
isolation, would seem to allow invocation of the right to counsel 
in the manner he proposes: 
 
 If, however, [the defendant] indicates in any manner 
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to 
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be 
no questioning. 
 
384 U.S. at 444-45.  Read in context, however, it is clear that 
the "process" referred to by the Court is the actual process of 
custodial interrogation. 
  
 The McNeil footnote also reflects the general 
proposition, consistent with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence,8 
that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States are primarily negative in character, standing guard as 
vigilant sentinels at the perimeter of permissible state conduct.  
See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); David P. Currie, 
Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
864 (1986).  But see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:  A 
Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271, 2273-78 & n.20 (1990) 
(critiquing the prevailing view of the Constitution as "a charter 
of negative liberties" and collecting scholarly sources espousing 
a similar view).  It is only at the time that the state seeks to 
invade this citadel of individual liberty that these 
constitutional guarantees can be summoned to battle.  This 
position has strong textual support in the Bill of Rights.  The 
right of free speech, the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the right to be free from double jeopardy, 
the right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, all of these 
are framed as prohibitions on state conduct, rather than as 
                     
8
.  In the context of the Due Process Clause, the negative nature 
of constitutional rights is viewed as imposing on the state no 
positive obligation to act absent some special circumstance such 
as custody.  See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, ___ U.S. ___, 
___, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (1992); DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-200 (1989); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980); D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1368-69 (3d Cir. 
1992) (in banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1045 
(1993). 
  
commandments for state action.  Similarly framed is the 
prohibition against compelled self-incrimination that is involved 
in this case.  U.S. Const. amend. V ("nor shall [any person] be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself").9  To require that the Government first act to compel 
an individual to incriminate herself before that individual can 
assert her right to remain silent is merely to recognize that the 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination acts as a shield 
against state action rather than as a sword, and that the shield 
may only be interposed when state action actually threatens.10 
                     
9
.  In fact, the entire Fifth Amendment is written in similar 
vein: 
 
 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger;  nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;  nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law;  nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. V. 
10
.  That Miranda imposes an affirmative obligation on 
interrogators to inform a suspect of his rights, indeed, to 
provide the suspect a lawyer if one cannot otherwise be afforded, 
does not change the basic negative nature of the Miranda 
protections, because the true protection of Miranda, the 
suppression of statements given without a valid waiver by the 
suspect of her Miranda rights, only arises if the state chooses 
to question a suspect without providing the Miranda warnings and 
attempts to introduce those statements in evidence.  See Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 479.  Until the attempt is made, the Miranda right, 
and the corresponding Fifth Amendment right it prophylactically 
protects, essentially lies dormant.  If the state never 
interrogates a suspect, Miranda is not implicated. 
  
 Our decision also finds support in the Ninth Circuit's 
opinion in United States v. Wright, 962 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1992).  
Wright presented a real-life example of the hypothetical posited 
by Justice Stevens in his McNeil dissent, the anticipatory 
invocation of the Miranda right to counsel.  Wright was arrested 
and pled guilty to armed robbery.  At the plea hearing, his 
attorney stated that she wanted to be present at any interviews 
with her client.  See id. at 954.  Shortly thereafter, Wright was 
interrogated, without counsel being present, as to an unrelated 
bank robbery.  He confessed, a confession that he moved to 
suppress.  When that was unsuccessful, he entered a conditional 
guilty plea and appealed on the basis that his counsel's 
statement at the hearing triggered the Edwards presumption 
concerning further police-initiated questioning.  See id. 
 The Ninth Circuit rejected the claim, holding that a 
request by counsel, during a plea hearing, to be present at any 
further "interviews" with a suspect did not trigger Edwards.  See 
id. at 956.  As explained by the court, McNeil compelled this 
conclusion: 
 McNeil strongly suggests that Miranda rights may not be 
invoked in advance outside the custodial context.  
Wright's request through his attorney would do just 
that if it were more broadly effective than to assure 
counsel's presence at interviews having to do with the 
robbery.  The Court has never held that Miranda rights 
may be invoked anticipatorily outside the context of 
custodial interrogation; we see no reason, apart from 
those already rejected in McNeil, to do so here. 
Id. at 955.  Though arguably distinguishable, since Wright was at 
a plea hearing, not "in custody," when he made his request for 
  
the presence of counsel at future interviews, the opinion is an 
affirmation of the principle expressed in footnote three of 
McNeil that there must be both custody and interrogation before 
the right to counsel can be invoked. 
 We recognize that some courts, post-McNeil, have found 
a proper invocation of the Miranda right to counsel when a 
suspect has requested counsel prior to interrogation or to the 
reading of the Miranda rights.  In United States v. Kelsey, 951 
F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991), petitioner Joseph Kelsey arrived at 
his home late one night to find eighteen members of a police 
narcotics task force conducting a search for contraband.  See id. 
at 1198.  He was searched and arrested before entering the house, 
and was placed on a couch alongside three others who had been 
arrested during the raid.  Kelsey asked to see his lawyer three 
or four times, but the police only responded that "if they 
'allow[ed] him to see [his] lawyer now, then they would not be 
able to ask [him] any further questions and would have to take 
[him] to jail.' . . . The police also told [Kelsey] that 'if [he] 
was to cooperate and talk with the officers, then they'd take it 
easy on [him] . . . .'"  Id. (alteration in original).  Kelsey 
was not questioned at this point, nor was he read his Miranda 
rights.  He was later questioned in his home and made 
incriminating statements during the interrogation.  See id. 
 The Tenth Circuit held that the request by Kelsey for 
his lawyer was sufficient to invoke the protections of Edwards, 
even thought the request was made before questioning or the 
reading of Miranda rights.  See id. at 1198-99.  Mindful of the 
  
requirement that there be "some statement that can reasonably be 
construed to be expression of a desire for the assistance of an 
attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police," 
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178 (emphasis omitted), the Court held that 
Kelsey's request for counsel after being arrested, when it was 
"clear from the exchange between Kelsey and the police . . . that 
the police intended to question Kelsey at some point at his home, 
and that the police understood Kelsey to be invoking his right to 
counsel during questioning," Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199, was 
sufficient to trigger Edwards.  The Court rejected the 
Government's argument that Rhode Island v. Innis required that 
there be questioning before the invocation of the right to 
counsel, finding that the fact that Kelsey asked for an attorney 
"before the police were required to inform him of that right 
[was] irrelevant."  Id. at 1199. 
 In State v. Torres, 412 S.E.2d 20 (N.C. 1992), the 
North Carolina Supreme Court examined a similar issue.  Georgia 
Torres was a battered spouse who one night, in the midst of an 
altercation with her intoxicated husband, shot him to death.  
Though not placed under arrest, she was transported by a police 
officer to the sheriff's department, and was detained in a 
conference room by a deputy from 7 P.M. to 10 P.M., pending 
questioning concerning the shooting of her husband.  At around 10 
P.M., she was taken into the sheriff's office, and the sheriff 
informed her that she would be shortly questioned by two other 
police officers.  See id. at 24.  At two points, while 
sequestered in the conference room and while meeting with the 
  
sheriff, Torres asked if she needed an attorney, and was told 
both times that she did not.  See id. at 23.  At 10:35, she was 
given her Miranda warnings, which she waived, was interrogated, 
and gave an incriminating statement.  See id. at 25.  She was 
thereafter convicted of murder. 
 On appeal, Torres argued that her interrogation 
violated Edwards, since she had made a request for counsel before 
the police initiated her interrogation.  The Court accepted her 
argument, finding that Edwards had been violated even though she 
was not being questioned at the time she requested an attorney: 
  . . . [T]he State argues that defendant could not 
have invoked her right to counsel because she was not 
being questioned at the time she inquired about an 
attorney. 
  . . . If defendant "at any stage of the process" 
indicates her desire to consult with counsel, all 
questioning must cease. . . . [A]lthough an individual 
cannot waive her right to counsel prior to receiving 
Miranda warnings, a suspect in custody can certainly 
assert her right to have counsel present during her 
impending interrogation prior to Miranda warnings and 
the actual onset of questioning. 
Id. at 25 (citations omitted).  The Court distinguished footnote 
three in the McNeil opinion by noting that "[t]he examples of 
'anticipatory invocation' cited by the Court in that . . . 
footnote . . . make clear that the Court had in mind situations 
in which a person was not in custody at the time of her 
invocation."  Id.  Thus, for the Torres court, it was sufficient 
for Miranda and Edwards purposes that the suspect was in custody 
and awaiting interrogation when she invoked her right to counsel.  
See id. at 26 ("It would make little sense to require a defendant 
already in custody to wait until the onset of questioning or the 
  
recitation of her Miranda rights before being permitted to invoke 
her right to counsel."). 
 The decisions in Kelsey and Torres are distinguishable 
from our decision in this case.  The suspects in both of those 
cases, though not being interrogated when they requested counsel, 
were faced with "impending interrogation."  Torres, 412 S.E.2d at 
26 (emphasis added); Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199.  Kelsey had just 
been arrested in his home, and the dialogue between him and his 
captors indicated he would be interrogated in his home.  See id.  
Torres had been taken to the police stationhouse immediately 
after shooting and killing her husband, and she was sitting in a 
conference room awaiting imminent questioning.  See 412 S.E.2d at 
25-26.  In no manner can Alston's situation be analogized to 
Kelsey and Torres.  In fact, when Alston requested counsel, he 
was in his cell, with no state official present, speaking to a 
representative of the Public Defender's office, having already 
been interrogated three days earlier, with no further 
interrogation pending, and without any indication that he was to 
be reinterrogated.  Whatever the merits of the position taken in 
those cases, i.e., an accused may invoke the right to counsel 
anticipatorily when an interrogation is imminent, the instant 
case falls outside the ambit of their reasoning.  Given that 
Alston was not being interrogated when he signed the invocation 
form, and that no interrogation was impending or imminent, we 
hold that Alston was not within the "context of custodial 
interrogation" when he signed the invocation form, and therefore 
  
that the prophylactic rules of Miranda and Edwards did not render 
inadmissible the statement taken on August 29th.11 
 
 D. 
 Even if we were to conclude that Alston could invoke 
his Miranda right to counsel when an interrogation was impending 
or imminent, we cannot conclude that the method used by Alston, 
i.e., advising the warden of his decision, was sufficient to 
trigger the protections of Miranda-Edwards and of Arizona v. 
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).  In Roberson, the Supreme Court 
rejected the contention that an interrogator's lack of knowledge 
concerning a previous invocation of the Miranda right to counsel 
vitiated the Edwards prophylactic: 
 In addition to the fact that Edwards focuses on the 
state of mind of the suspect and not of the police, 
custodial interrogation must be conducted pursuant to 
established procedures, and those procedures in turn 
must enable an officer who proposes to initiate an 
interrogation to determine whether the suspect has 
previously requested counsel.  . . . [W]hether the same 
or different law enforcement authorities are involved 
in the second investigation, the same need to determine 
whether the suspect has requested counsel exists.  The 
police department's failure to honor that request 
cannot be justified by the lack of diligence of a 
particular officer. 
                     
11
.  Additionally, we note that the extension of Miranda and 
Edwards implicitly requested by petitioner, i.e., allowing him to 
invoke the right to counsel outside of the context of custodial 
interrogation, would diminish the "bright-line" nature of the 
Supreme Court's Miranda jurisprudence, often cited by the Court 
as one of qualities of that body of law.  See Jackson, 475 U.S. 
at 634; Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984); Quarles, 467 
U.S. at 658; Fare, 442 U.S. at 718. 
  
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687-88 (footnote omitted).  Applying this 
language on direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
the investigating officers who interrogated Alston on August 29th 
could not be charged with "constructive knowledge" of an 
invocation contained in "records which are merely accessible to 
other state agents who function at the custodial level."  Alston, 
554 A.2d at 310.  The court therefore concluded that the 
interrogation of August 19th did not run afoul of Roberson.  We 
agree, though on different grounds.  While the holding of the 
Delaware Supreme Court is based on a determination that the 
warden of Gander Hill prison never had possession, and thus never 
had knowledge, of Alston's pro forma invocation, see id., our 
decision turns on the inapplicability of Roberson to a non-
investigating state official such as a warden.12 
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.  Because the Delaware Supreme Court rested its decision on 
this point, i.e., that the warden never had knowledge because he 
had no possession, we feel compelled to address it.  We believe 
that basing the decision in this case on these grounds goes too 
far.  If the state puts into place a record-keeping system that, 
as an essential element, contemplates that records will be 
maintained by a third-party, e.g., the Public Defender's office, 
it would be inequitable to allow the state official charged with 
administering the system to disclaim at least constructive 
knowledge of the information contained in those records.  We 
therefore do not find the warden's lack of actual possession of 
Alston's letter to be dispositive. 
     We also note in passing that petitioner neither here nor 
below argued that the state should be estopped from questioning 
the validity of his pro forma invocation, due to the warden's 
establishment of and participation in the procedure employed in 
Gander Hill.  While we do not reach the issue, we do not mean to 
diminish any due process considerations that may accompany 
official conduct that actively misleads an accused in the 
exercise of her Miranda rights.  Cf. Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 
508, 516 n.11 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting, in dicta, the 
contention that the state can disregard a suspect's invocation of 
the right to counsel that is made after he has been given his 
  
 The Supreme Court's opinion in Roberson focused on 
multiple interrogations concerning different crimes, principally 
holding that the Miranda right to counsel was not offense-
specific.  See 486 U.S. at 682-85.  As a corollary to that 
holding, the Court directed that "custodial interrogation must be 
conducted pursuant to established procedures, and those 
procedures in turn must enable an officer who proposes to 
initiate an interrogation to determine whether the suspect has 
previously requested counsel."  Id. at 687 (emphasis added).  
Later interrogators are thus charged with the knowledge of what 
occurred during prior interrogations, not what occurred during 
other time periods, i.e., while the suspect was sitting in his 
cell speaking with a representative from the Public Defender's 
office.  The practical implication of this conclusion is that 
noninvestigatory officials charged with the mere custody or care 
of a suspect, e.g., jailers, doctors, vocational instructors, 
should not be considered state agents capable of accepting a 
suspect's invocation of his Miranda rights.13  Any other 
interpretation of Roberson would not provide serviceable guidance 
to law enforcement officials seeking to administer the Miranda-
Edwards protections, since, in effect, they would become 
absolutely liable for any statement made by an incarcerated 
(..continued) 
Miranda warnings, even if the suspect is not yet in custody), 
cert. denied sub nom. Singletary v. Tukes, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. 
Ct. 273 (1991). 
13
.  With the caveat that someone acting as an investigatory 
official's agent in conducting an interrogation would likely 
assume the status of her principal. 
  
suspect to his jailer.14  This conclusion is consistent with our 
rejection supra of anticipatory invocations.  If Alston cannot 
assert his Miranda rights anticipatorily, it would make little 
sense to permit him to assert them to the warden, a 
noninvestigatory state official. 
 Petitioner cites to no case law, other than Roberson 
itself, supporting his contention that the knowledge of his 
putative invocation on the 26th must be imputed to the officers 
who interrogated him on the 29th, and the Court's research has 
likewise failed to unearth any such support.  On the contrary, 
the courts that have applied Roberson were dealing with 
defendants who were reinterrogated notwithstanding earlier 
requests for counsel that were made to law enforcement officers.  
See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 963 F.2d 243, 244-45 (9th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1297 (8th Cir. 
1991);  Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 736, 745-46 (Miss. 
1992); State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565, 570 (S.D. 1993); cf. 
People v. Young, 607 N.E.2d 123, 126-28 (Ill. 1992) (refusing to 
impute knowledge from a Wisconsin law enforcement agency to an 
Illinois law enforcement agency).  We conclude that knowledge of 
                     
14
.  Petitioner's focus on Roberson's admonition that Edwards 
"focuses on the state of mind of the suspect," 486 U.S. at 687, 
does not change the result.  In Edwards, there was no question 
that there had been a proper invocation of the right to counsel.  
See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479 (suspect stated during custodial 
interrogation that "I want an attorney before making a deal").  
Absent such a proper invocation, the suspect's state of mind is 
essentially irrelevant, because a suspect cannot "believe" a 
right into existence.  Since Alston's initial invocation was 
insufficient, the fact that he believed he had invoked his right 
to counsel is beside the point. 
  
the letter "sent" by Alston to the warden of the Gander Hill 
facility cannot be imputed to the police officers who 
interrogated Alston on the 29th, and that the interrogation was 
therefore not violative of Miranda, Edwards, or Roberson.15 
 
 *  *  * 
 
 We decline to extend the reach of Miranda-Edwards to 
encompass a suspect sitting in his cell, free of any 
interrogation, impending or otherwise.  As the Supreme Court 
stated in rejecting the McNeil petitioner's proposal to expand 
Miranda, "[i]f a suspect does not wish to communicate with the 
police except through an attorney, he can simply tell them that 
when they give him the Miranda warnings."  McNeil, 501 U.S. at 
180.  We add no more. 
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.  Alston's argument that the absence of a waiver of counsel 
form on file in the warden's office is notice of an invocation of 
the right to counsel is also without merit.  The presence or 
absence of forms in a custodial state agent's files cannot 
suffice for the imputation of knowledge to investigatory 
officials. 
  
 IV. 
 Petitioner also argues that the magistrate and district 
judges erred in concluding that the admission of the statements 
taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
harmless error.  Before the Delaware state courts, and before 
this Court, the respondents have acknowledged that the statements 
of August 29th concerning the Medkeff-Sands robberies were 
impermissibly taken, since Alston's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had attached once the indictment of August 28th was 
returned, and he was interrogated without his lawyer being 
present.  See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) 
(applying the Edwards presumption concerning police-initiated 
interrogations to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United 
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 198 (1984); Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).16  The state courts and the 
district court found that this error, however, was harmless, 
since there was sufficient evidence introduced during trial to 
convict Alston regardless.  We agree. 
 In Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2730 (1994), we recently held 
that admission of a statement taken in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is "trial type error," requiring on 
collateral review application of the harmless error standard 
                     
16
.  Under Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 & n.16 (1985), 
interrogation concerning the other crimes was permissible, 
notwithstanding the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel as to the Medkeff-Sands robberies.  This point is not 
contested on appeal. 
  
utilized in Brecht v. Abrahamson, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1710 
(1993).  See Deputy, 19 F.3d at 1495-96; see also Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991) (opinion of Rehnquist, 
C.J., for the Court) (characterizing a "confession obtained in 
violation of Massiah" as a "trial error").  Under Brecht, "where 
a constitutional error is a 'trial type error' which implicates 
the weight and effect of evidence presented to the jury, we must 
ask whether the error had 'substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury's verdict.'"  Deputy, 19 F.3d 
at 1496 (quoting Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722).  The analysis 
"'must take account of what the error meant to [the jury], not 
singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that 
happened.'"  Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)).  
Only if the error was not harmless can the writ of habeas corpus 
issue. 
 The evidence at trial concerning the Medkeff-Sands 
robberies was substantial.  Both victims identified Alston as the 
perpetrator, Alston's fingerprint was recovered at the scene, and 
Alston confessed to the crime during the interrogation of August 
23rd.  The evidence introduced concerning the August 29th 
confession, consisting of the testimony of one of the 
interrogators as well as a transcript of the confession, which 
had been recorded, was in essence cumulative.  Viewed in relation 
to the other evidence in the case as to the Medkeff-Sands 
robberies, the Court finds that the August 29th statements did 
not have a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's 
  
verdict, and their introduction into evidence was therefore 
harmless error.17 
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.  The Delaware Supreme Court applied the higher standard 
announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967), 
finding that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Alston, 554 A.2d at 309.  Were the Court required to apply this 
standard, we would reach the same conclusion. 
  
 V. 
 Petitioner's final point of appeal is that the 
interrogation of August 29th somehow denied him "fundamental 
fairness," and was therefore violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process clause.  In support of this argument, 
petitioner states that he "could not resist the pressures of 
custodial interrogation," and argues that this is the only 
possible conclusion "because, otherwise, it is incomprehensible 
why a 28 year [old] literate man with three prior felonies would 
so readily incriminate himself."  Pet. Br. at 32.  Petitioner 
apparently claims that his waiver of his Miranda rights at the 
beginning of the August 29th interrogation was somehow faulty, 
and he was therefore deprived of his right to counsel.  See 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (providing that the Miranda safeguards 
may be waived, "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently"); Ahmad v. Redman, 782 F.2d 409, 
412-13 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986).  The 
respondents argue that this issue was initially raised in 
petitioner's objections to the magistrate's report, was therefore 
not properly before the district court, and ipso facto is not 
properly before this Court.  Whatever merit respondent's position 
may have, the record in this case indicates that the magistrate 
judge addressed petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment claim, see 
Report & Recommendation at 12, and we will do likewise. 
 "[T]he voluntariness of a defendant's waiver of Miranda 
rights is a mixed question of law and fact, subject to plenary 
review by federal habeas courts."  Ahmad, 782 F.2d at 413.  
  
Though we do not treat with deference the legal conclusions 
reached by the state court, the underlying factual findings, upon 
which the court based its conclusions, if fairly supported by the 
record, are entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness 
provided by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).  See McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 
F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 
645 (1993); Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 254 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1679 (1992).  In assessing 
the validity of the waiver, we must determine whether it was 
voluntary, i.e., free of coercion or deception, and whether it 
was knowing.  "Only if the 'totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice 
and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly 
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived."  Moran, 475 
U.S. at 421 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725); see 
United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1084 (3d Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990). 
 The Delaware courts found that Alston understood his 
Miranda rights when he signed the waiver form proffered to him at 
the beginning of the August 29th interrogation.  See App. at 118, 
254.  This finding has a basis in the record, given defendant's 
execution of the waiver form and the testimony of the 
interrogating officers concerning their recitation of the rights 
and Alston's acknowledgement that he understood them.  Cf. 
Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir.) (in banc) ("It 
may be assumed that [a written waiver's] main purpose is 
evidentiary, to establish with a minimum of difficulty and a 
  
maximum of certainty that the police gave the warnings and that 
the suspect had agreed--preliminarily--to answer questions."), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877 (1974).  There is also no contention 
that Alston did not understand his Miranda rights when he waived 
them during the interrogation of August 23rd.  Given the 
presumption of correctness, we are satisfied that Alston 
understood his Miranda rights, and that he did knowingly waive 
them at the August 29th interrogation. 
 As to the question of voluntariness, the only 
indication in the record of any coercion on the part of the 
interrogators is the offer to Alston to make a plea 
recommendation to the prosecutors if Alston cooperated fully in 
the interrogation.  "That a law enforcement officer promises 
something to a person suspected of a crime in exchange for the 
person's speaking about the crime does not automatically render 
inadmissible any statement obtained as a result of that promise."  
United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1028 (3d Cir. 1993); see 
Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 604-08 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Miller v. Neubert, 479 U.S. 989 (1986).  The question of 
voluntariness ultimately turns on whether the totality of the 
circumstances indicates that the will of the suspect was 
overborne by government coercion.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986); Moran, 475 U.S. at 421; Walton, 10 F.3d 
at 1028.  In making its assessment, the Court must evaluate the 
events that occurred, as well as the suspect's background and 
experience, including prior dealings with the criminal justice 
system.  See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983) 
  
(plurality opinion); United States v. Cruz Jimenez, 894 F.2d 1, 
7-8 (1st Cir. 1990); Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1086. 
 The Delaware Supreme Court made the following findings 
of fact concerning Alston's background: 
 Alston was 28 years old at the time of his arrest and 
had previously been convicted of three felonies.  
Alston had completed the tenth grade and was able to 
read and write.  At the time his statements were made 
he was alert and did not appear to be under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs.  The interviews were 
during the day, and each interview lasted approximately 
one to one and one-half hours.  Although in custody, 
Alston was not handcuffed during either session. 
Alston, 554 A.2d at 307.  We find no reason, and Alston makes no 
claim, to disturb these findings.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 
Reese, 946 F.2d at 254. 
 As to the promise, the investigators promised Alston 
during the interrogation of August 23rd that they would recommend 
to the prosecutor that Alston be allowed to plead to one count of 
first degree robbery, a promise conditioned on Alston's full 
cooperation.  The promise was made with the caveat that the 
recommendation was in no way binding on the prosecutor.  App. at 
41-42, 54-55.  During the course of the first interrogation, 
Alston did not mention a robbery that the police suspected him 
in, a robbery to which Alston confessed during the second 
interrogation after the police prompted him.  Due to this failure 
to cooperate, as well as the police's strong belief that Alston 
had been involved in other crimes as to which he did not confess 
at either interrogation, the police informed the prosecutor of 
the proposal made to Alston, but did not make the recommendation.  
  
App. at 102-03.  As already noted, Alston was then indicted on 
nine counts of first degree robbery and nine counts of second 
degree conspiracy. 
 In light of Alston's age, literacy, and prior 
experience with the criminal justice system, as well as the 
limited nature of the promise made by the investigators, a 
promise to make a non-binding recommendation to the prosecutor, 
the Court finds that Alston's written waiver of his Miranda 
rights on August 29th was not coerced.  Alston's three prior 
convictions indicate that he was not "an 'uninitiated novice,' 
susceptible to coercive pressure or threats by law enforcement 
officers."  Cruz Jimenez, 894 F.2d at 8.  If anything, his 
dealings with the criminal justice system would have allowed him 
to fully comprehend the serious situation in which he found 
himself, as well as the nature of the circumscribed promise made 
to him.  Faced with substantial charges, implicated in the 
Medkeff-Sands robberies by fingerprint evidence, and incriminated 
by his confession of August 23rd, a confession that he does not 
challenge, Alston's decision on August 29th to waive his Miranda 
rights and cooperate with the authorities was a reasonable one, 
and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the promise 
made coerced him into waiving his rights. 
 As Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurrence in 
Edwards, the Supreme Court "consistently has 'rejected any 
paternalistic rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent 
and voluntary decisions about his own criminal case.'"  Edwards, 
451 U.S. at 490-91 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Mosley, 
  
423 U.S. at 109 (White, J., concurring)).  We find that Alston 
made just such an autonomous decision when he waived his Miranda 
rights and spoke with the police on August 29th, and that he was 
not denied in any way the "fundamental fairness" guaranteed him 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 VI. 
 This petition has raised some significant questions 
concerning the efficacy of the procedures used in Delaware's 
Gander Hill prison facility.  Perhaps if this Court were charged 
with crafting a procedure for the recordation and maintenance of 
a suspect's invocation of his right to counsel, we would devise a 
less cumbersome system than the one applied to the petitioner.  
But it is not our task to develop such a system, nor do we sit as 
an ecumenical overseer of the state's detention procedures.  We 
are solely charged with determining whether petitioner is being 
held in violation of his constitutional rights.  Limited as we 
are to this jurisdictional grant, we find that there was no 
deprivation of Alston's constitutional rights, and will affirm 
the district court's denial of Alston's petition. 
 
